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Abstract: Initially, before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, differences 
in integration between members of the European Communities (EC; 
later the European Union) were relatively few and usually temporary 
in nature. The Schengen Agreement, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, and the possibility of establishing enhanced 
cooperation meant that the problem was becoming more and more 
important in the functioning of the EU—both in theory and in practice.
 The objective of the paper is to show that for several years, along 
with the stagnation in the deepening of integration between all 
the EU Member States, differentiation of integration in the EU is 
progressing very rapidly. The progressing differentiation in the EU is 
a consequence of mainly two processes: the development of enhanced 
cooperation and reforms in the eurozone, which are strengthened by 
the widening of the EU.
 The article covers the issue of the categorization of differentiation of 
European Union integration, which constitutes the theoretical framework 
for further considerations. Specified processes which contribute to 
increasing the differentiation of the EU are discussed, showing the 
development of enhanced cooperation in the EU and presenting the 
reforms of the eurozone. The article concludes with the identification 
and the consequences of differentiated integration, both those that have 
already occurred and those that may occur in the future. 
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1. Introduction
Since the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the 
European Union (EU) failed to successfully introduce a project that would 
deepen integration and which would include all Member States without 
exception. The Treaty of Lisbon (TL) is only a reaction to the failure to ratify 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
The objective of the paper is to show that for several years, along with the 
stagnation in the deepening of integration between all the EU Member States, 
differentiation of integration in the EU is progressing very rapidly. For several 
decades of the integration process, the principle of unitary integration constituted 
its base and “meta-frame”. Differentiated integration was seen in a negative 
light, as a phenomenon which was sometimes necessary, albeit exceptional and 
temporary, or “as directly damaging, even destructive of, solidarity” (Dyson 
& Marcusen, 2010, p. 18). The progressing differentiation in the EU is a 
consequence of two key processes. The first is the practical application of the 
provisions on enhanced cooperation, which had remained dormant for about a 
decade. The second process involves the reforms in the eurozone introduced in 
the wake of the economic crisis, which meant the deepening of integration, albeit 
only between countries belonging to the monetary union. As a consequence, 
the differences in the depth of integration between the states belonging and 
not belonging to the eurozone are deepening further still. As a result, if we 
were to use an axis where one end signified unification, whilst the other 
differentiation, we would see that the EU is moving increasingly faster towards 
differentiation. This trend poses a challenge for the functioning of the EU and 
the integration process. So, the paper relates to the one of the geographical types 
of differentiation—differentiation within EU borders (Kölliker, 2006, p. 51).  
This tendency is strengthened by what may be considered as EU’s most effective 
instrument having an impact on security and stability—namely, the widening of 
the EU. So far, the subsequent stages of EU widening (previously, widening of 
the European Communities; EC) were accompanied by far-reaching measures 
aimed at deepening integration. Meanwhile, along with EU’s largest ever 
enlargement in the years 2004–2013 when 13 new Member States were admitted 
into the EU, no project aimed at deepening EU integration has been effectively 
implemented. 
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The paper deals with two aspects of differentiation in the EU—legal and 
institutional. Economic, political or identity-based differences, though very 
important for the EU, are not discussed here. The first part of the article is 
devoted to the issue of the categorization of differentiation of EU integration, 
which constitutes the theoretical framework for further considerations. The 
second part contains examples of differentiation of integration in the EU 
(EC) before 2010. The next two parts relate to specified processes, which 
contribute to increasing the differentiation of the EU—the third part shows the 
development of enhanced cooperation in the EU whilst the fourth part mentions 
the reforms of the eurozone. The fifth part is devoted to the identification and 
the consequences of differentiated integration, both those that have already 
occurred and those that may occur in the future. The main conclusions are 
contained in the summary. 
2. Categorization of the concept of differentiated integration in the 
European Union
According to a frequently cited definition, the differentiation of integration 
in the EU is “the differential validity of formal EU rules across countries” 
(Schimmelfenning & Winzen, 2014, p. 356) or “the possibility of Member States 
to have different rights and obligations with respect to certain common policy 
areas” (Kölliker, 2006, p. 14). Differentiation sensu lato means “instances where 
Member States (or regions within Member States) are not subjected to a uniform 
legal regime, even though they concern matters which fall within the scope of 
application” of the treaties. Differentiation sensu stricto concerns “instances 
where EU primary or secondary law distinguishes between its addressees”. The 
use of the term ‘differentiation’ in both presented meanings is not mutually 
exclusive (Tuytschaever, 1999, pp. 2–3). A broader definition, in which two 
aspects of differentiation—functional and territorial—is brought together has 
been proposed by Kenneth Dyson and Angelos Sepos (2010, p. 4).   
The concept of differentiated integration in the framework of the EC emerged 
in politics in 1974 in a speech of the chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Willy Brandt, and then in Leo Tindemans’ report presented in 1976 
(Piris, 2012, p. 67; Ehlermann, 1998, p. 249). The concept made way for a 
political and scientific debate, which has continued for several decades now. 
It resulted in interesting theoretical and empirical achievements, which, 
however, do not exhaust all the issues and are not fully structured (Holzinger 
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& Schimmelfennig, 2012). The main theories of European integration, such as 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism or constructivism, 
 have not tried to explain the observed patterns of differentiation. 
Instead, research on the causes and consequences of differentiated 
integration has developed from general discussions about the alleged 
trade-off between deeper and broader participation in multi-lateral 
agreements (Zhelyazkova, 2014, pp. 728–729).
When attempting to organize the concepts relating to differentiated integration, 
Alexander C.-G. Stubb highlights the following factors as criteria of 
differentiation: time, space and matter. In the case of time-related differentiation, 
the individual states do not participate in integration projects simultaneously 
but at different times. The differentiation of integration, understood in the 
context of space, means that any one integration project is accepted only in a 
certain part of the territory of an organization. Finally, as regards the criterion of 
matter—individual integration projects are freely chosen by the members of the 
integration groupings as if from a restaurant menu (Stubb, 1996, pp. 283–285). 
As noted by Katharina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig (2012, 
pp. 296–297), the problem with Stubb’s classification is that it is not analytically 
disjointed and they propose a classification based on six dimensions: (1) permanent 
v. temporary differentiation; (2) territorial v. purely functional differentiation; 
(3) differentiation across nation states v. multi-level differentiation; (4) 
differentiation that takes place within the EU treaties v. outside the EU treaties; 
(5) decision-making at the EU level v. at regime level; (6) only for Member 
States v. also for non-Member States/areas outside the EU territory. In another 
article, Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen (2014, p. 355) introduce a 
distinction between the two types of differentiation in EU treaties, which differ 
in origin. The first is “instrumental differentiation”, transitional and “motivated 
by efficiency and distributional concerns”. It is a consequence of accepting 
states into the EU (“widening”). However, “constitutional differentiation” 
results from “treaty revisions among existing Member States, which transfer 
additional competences to the Union (‘deepening’)”. 
Filip Tuytschaever (1999, pp. 116–121) has also distinguished between several 
types of differentiation: 
1) actual (“when primary or secondary law, upon its entry into force, establish 
a differentiated regime”) and potential (“occurs when provisions of primary 
or secondary law do not by their very existence establish a differentiated 
regime, but form the basis for future actual differentiation”); 
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2) inter-State differentiation (i.e. between EU Member States) and intra-State 
differentiation (i.e. between regions within Member States); 
3) temporary and non-temporary; 
4) general (concerning all Member States) and specific (concerning 
specifically designated Member States or regions); 
5) positive (i.e. differentiation which occurs when “primary law permits a 
limited number of Member States to adopt rules which apply only as far as 
they are concerned”) and negative (i.e. “differentiation which, actually or 
potentially, excludes one or several or all Member States, either temporarily 
or permanently, from a rule which is adopted by all Member States”). 
A division in which the aforementioned criteria of time, space and matter play a 
role is the distinction between “vertical” and “horizontal” differentiation. Vertical 
differentiation means that integration within a framework of common policies 
proceeds at different speeds and achieves various degrees of centralization. 
Horizontal differentiation means spatial differentiation and is based on the 
fact that arrangements concerning common policies do not apply in a uniform 
manner in all the Member States. Horizontal differentiation can be at the 
same time “internal differentiation” if not all EU Member States participate 
in a given political framework and “external differentiation”, in which at least 
one country from outside the EU participates in a given political framework 
(Schimmelfennig, Leuffen & Rittberger, 2015).
A simple division of states not only belonging to the EU is proposed by Jean-
Claude Piris, who distinguishes between a “two-speed” Europe and a “two-class” 
(“two-tier”) Europe. In the first case, the diversity of integration is of temporary 
nature, i.e. states that at any given moment do not participate in a specified 
integration project join it later. However, the latter concerns the member states 
not all of which belong to the EU, and is something constant (Piris, 2012, pp. 6–7). 
Besides, according to Piris, it is more precise to speak of “multi-speed” integration 
rather than “two-speed” integration in relation to the EU, since the groups of states 
participating in the various integration projects are different. In the case of “multi-
speed” integration, all EU Member States do the same thing, but not at the same 
time or at the same pace. However, in the case of the “two-class” (“two-tier”) 
Europe type, there is no fixed group of states participating in all projects, but in 
any case, other countries can be included into this group. This form of cooperation 
may lead to “multi-speed” integration (Piris, 2012, pp. 61–70).  
A synthetic overview of the theoretical approaches, concepts and typologies 
relating to the differentiation of integration is included in the paper by 
Holzinger and Schimmelfenning (2012), whilst the concepts used with regard to 
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differentiated integration and enhanced cooperation is discussed, for example, 
by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (1998, pp. 246–247).
3. Differentiation of integration in the EU (EC) before 2010
With the diversity of integration in the EU (EC) we have to start from the very 
beginning of the integration process. The most significant examples arising from 
the provisions of the EU (EC) primary law are:
• The right to establish “regional unions” between Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands on the basis of Article 233, Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community “in so far as the objectives of these 
regional unions are not achieved by application” of the EEC Treaty (present 
Art. 350 of the TFEU);
• Transition periods included in accession treaties, on the basis of which 
states joining the EC (EU) have time to fully customize their law to the 
acquis communautaire;
• The Schengen agreements (1985 and 1990) and the acquis developed 
later, which until 1999 remained outside the legal framework of the EU 
(European Union, 1997a);
• Economic and Monetary Union—according to former Article 109k of TEC 
(Treaty on European Union, 1992), the EU Member States that do not meet 
all the criteria for participation in the third stage of the EMU are covered 
by a derogation, what means that they remain outside the euro area (present 
Art. 139 of the TFEU);
• The right of the United Kingdom (European Union, 1992b) and Denmark 
(European Union, 1992a) not to participate in the third stage of the EMU;
• The right of Denmark to keep its legislation on the acquisition of property 
(European Union, 1992d);
• The right of the United Kingdom not to participate in “Agreement on 
social policy” concluded between the remaining eleven EC Member States 
(European Union, 1992c);
• The right of the United Kingdom and Ireland to exercise control on the 
borders of these states with other EU (EC) states regardless of the then 
Article 7a of TEC. On the basis of reciprocity, the same rights were granted 
to other EU (EC) Member States, to which people entered from the United 
Kingdom and Ireland (European Union, 1997b);      
• The United Kingdom, Ireland (European Union, 1997d) and Denmark 
(European Union, 1997c) were not bound by the then Title IIIa of TEC 
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(on visas, asylum, migration and other policies related to free movement 
of persons), unless these states would express willingness to participate in 
measures and actions adopted within the framework of these policies. 
Another example of differentiation of integration was the Prüm Convention 
(Convention between 2006). It was signed on 27 of May 2005 by Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain and 
concerned stepping up cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. In 2008, provisions of the 
Prüm convention have been incorporated in the EU acquis (Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA, Council Decision 2008/616/JHA). 
At last, according to the new protocol attached to the EU treaties on the basis 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, provisions contained in the title IV of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights do not create “justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the 
United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided 
for such rights in its national law” (European Union, 2007a).
4. Development of enhanced cooperation in the European Union 
Enhanced cooperation is one of the examples of the flexibility of the process of 
integration, and its introduction into EU’s primary law was de jure a strengthening 
and confirmation of the departure from the general principle (this situation was 
de facto present from the inception of the EC), stating that in the framework of 
the integration process, all Member States shall adopt the same legal regulations 
at the same time. Enhanced cooperation, introduced into EU primary law by 
virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997; TA), apart from cooperation based on 
special arrangements (largely via “protocolization”) and constructive abstention 
and opt-outs, was one of the three types of flexibility in the TA (Philippart & 
Edwards, 1999, p. 98).  
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), arrangements 
for enhanced cooperation have been included both in the TEU, in Article 20 
(Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union, 2012), and in the 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU; 2012). The detailed regulations, which clarify the content of Article 20 
of the TEU, are contained in Articles 326–334 of the TFEU. 
For about a decade since the introduction of the TA, the provisions concerning 
enhanced cooperation were not used in practice. Theoretical attempts to explain 
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how and when enhanced cooperation is undertaken were made by, for example, 
Daniela A. Kroll and Dirk Leuffen (2015). For the first time, the EU Council 
decided that all the conditions required by the TEU and the TFEU for it to be 
established have been met, and adopted the relevant decision on 12 July 2010, 
authorizing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce 
and legal separation between Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia 
(Council Decision 2010/405/EU).1 As a consequence, on 20 December 2010, 
these 14 states adopted the regulation (Council Regulation 1259/2010/EU), 
which became applicable on 21 June 2012.2
The establishment of enhanced cooperation for the second time concerned unitary 
patent protection (UPP) in the EU. The decision to undertake enhanced cooperation 
was taken in accordance with Article 329, Section 1 of the TFEU by the EU Council 
of 10 March, 2011 (Council Decision 2011/167/EU). On its basis, all EU states, 
with the exception of Italy and Spain, participated in enhanced cooperation on a 
uniform system of patent protection. The package making up the UPP consists of 
two regulations: one concerning unitary patent protection (Regulation 1257/2012/
EU), the related appropriate language regulations (Regulation 1260/2012/EU) and 
an international agreement that is expected to create a Single Patent Court before 
which disputes would be settled (Agreement…, 2013). 
Actions aimed at the establishment of enhanced cooperation in the field of the 
UPP were met with opposition from Spain and Italy. They appealed the decision 
of the Council to the EU Court of Justice. In its judgment of 16 April 2013, the 
EU Court of Justice considered all the arguments of Spain and Italy as unjustified, 
and therefore dismissed the complaints of these Member States (Joint Cases 
C-274/11 and C-295/11). However, in March 2013, Spain launched two new 
challenges with the EU Court of Justice against the regulations implementing 
the unitary patent system. In its judgments (5 May 2015), the EU Court of 
Justice fully dismissed the Spanish claims (Case C-146/13 and Case C-147/13). 
Following a request by the government of Italy, it became a participant of unitary 
patent regulations in September 2015 (Commission Decision 2015/1753/EU). 
As a result, all the EU Member States, except Spain and Croatia, take part in the 
enhanced cooperation in unitary patent protection system.    
1 See more on this problem, e.g., Peers, 2010, pp. 339–358; Kuipers, 2012, pp. 201–
229; Fiorini, 2010, pp. 1143–1158.
2 On 21 November 2012, the Commission adopted the decision 2012/714/EU confirm-
ing the participation of Lithuania and on 27 January 2014 of Greece (Commission 
Decision 2014/39/EU) in enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to 
divorce and legal separation.
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The third instance of establishing enhanced cooperation was with regard to 
financial transaction tax (FTT). The EU Council adopted a decision authorizing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of FTT on 22 January 2013 (Council Decision 
13/52/EU). In accordance with Article 1 of this decision, it authorizes 11 
Member States (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia3) to engage in enhanced cooperation 
for the purpose of establishing a common FTT system. 
Just as in the case of the UPP, the decision of the EU Council authorizing the 
establishment of enhanced cooperation in the field of FTT was challenged in 
the EU Court of Justice. On April 18, 2013, the United Kingdom, on the basis 
of Article 263 of the TFEU, filed a complaint for the annulment of EU Council 
decision 13/52/EU in connection with violation of Articles 327 and 332 of the 
TFEU and the customary international law (Case C-209/13). In its judgement, 
the EU Court of Justice both refuted the pleas raised by the United Kingdom and 
dismissed this state’s complaint (Item 40). 
An overview of differentiated membership of the EU’s Member States in the 
three enhanced cooperations is provided in Figure 1.   
Figure 1. Membership of the EU’s Member States in enhanced cooperation in the EU
 – EU 28
 – EU participants of the enhanced cooperation in law applicable to divorce 
  and legal separation   
	 –	 EU	participants	of	the	enhanced	cooperation	in	financial	transactions	tax
 – EU participants of the enhanced cooperation in unitary patent protection 
Source: Own work inspired by Kölliker, 2006, p. 20.
3 In December 2015, Estonia announced that it no longer supports the financial trans-
actions tax. This state is concerned that the tax would hardly generate any revenue, 
while scaring away financial institutions at the same time.
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5. Reforms of the eurozone as a factor enhancing  
differentiated integration in the EU
The fact that some EU Member States would remain outside the eurozone had 
already been taken into account when the legal bases for the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) were created. In accordance with Article 109k of the 
TEEC (Treaty on European Union, 1992), the EU Member States that do not 
meet all of the criteria for participation in the third stage of the EMU are covered 
by a derogation. Currently, this is the subject of Article 139 of the TFEU. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Denmark were given the opportunity not 
to participate in the third stage of the EMU on the basis of the relevant protocols 
(European Union, 1992a, b). 
The economic crisis and the measures and decisions taken in connection with 
it by the Member States and EU institutions have become a factor that greatly 
contributed to enhancing differentiation within the EU. The main criterion for 
the strengthening of this differentiation is membership or remaining outside the 
eurozone. A formal expression of the deepening of the political and institutional 
differentiation between the EU countries belonging to the Monetary Union and 
other countries, is the new Protocol on the Euro Group (European Union, 2007b) 
attached to the TL. 
For the purpose of strengthening control over the budgetary policies of EU 
States, preventing excessive budget deficits and intensifying and accelerating 
the imposition of penalties for failure to meet commitments, the so-called Six-
Pack4 measures were adopted in 2011. Two of its legal acts only apply to those 
EU Member States whose currency is the euro (Regulations 1173/2011/EU and 
1174/2011/EU). 
Another very significant document consolidating and deepening divisions 
among the EU states is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (2012), colloquially called the fiscal 
compact. An agreement as to its conclusion was agreed at the summit of the 
euro area countries on December 9, 2011 (Euro Summit Statement, 2011) and it 
was eventually signed at a meeting of the European Council on 2 March 2012 by 
representatives of all the EU states, except the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic. This Treaty applies to the countries of the euro area (Art. 1(2)), and 
4 The “Six-Pack” consists of five regulations of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011) and directive of 
the Council 2011/85/EU.
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to those countries which signed and ratified it, and have declared that they wish 
to be bound earlier by some or all of the provisions of Title III and IV of the 
Treaty (Art. 14(5)).5
Yet another document, the importance of which is not as significant once the 
said Six-Pack and fiscal compact are adopted, but which needs mentioning, is 
the Euro Plus Pact. It was adopted at the meeting of the European Council on 
24 and 25 March 2011 by yet another configuration of EU states than was the 
case when the aforementioned documents were signed. This group consisted of 
Poland, Bulgaria, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania, constituting yet 
another manifestation of the progressive differentiation in the EU (The Euro Plus 
Pact, 2011). The Euro Plus Pact is a form of cooperation formally outside the 
institutional framework of the EU, although, in accordance with its provisions, 
EU institutions are used for the delivery of its objectives. 
At the same meeting of the European Council (24–25 March 2011), several 
decisions were also made which perpetuate the differences between the Member 
States of the euro area and the other members of the EU to an even greater degree. 
Namely, the European Council (2011) decided to add to Article 136 of the TFEU 
a paragraph, according to which members of the EMU can establish a “stability 
mechanism”, under which it will be possible to grant financial assistance. In 
connection with this decision, the European Council decided that the states of 
the euro area would set up a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
What is especially important in the context of differentiated integration in the 
EU is, first of all, that this mechanism is only supposed to serve the needs of the 
states of the euro area exclusively. The participation of states from outside the 
eurozone would only be limited to participation in providing assistance to euro 
area countries.
5 Among the members of the EU, several groups of countries formed with different 
statuses in relation to the “fiscal compact”: 
 – Eurozone Member States, which  are bound by all Treaty provisions (19 states);
 – Denmark and Romania, which have declared themselves to be bound by all Treaty 
titles; 
 – Bulgaria, that declared itself bound by all Treaty titles except of Title IV;
 – Sweden, Poland and Hungary, which are not bound by any of the fiscal or economic 
provisions, but to which applies only Title V, covering euro summit participation 
(automatically applies for ratifying non-eurozone member states);
 – United Kingdom, Czech Republic and Croatia, which are not parties of the fiscal 
pact and which may accede to the Treaty. 
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6.  The importance of differentiated integration for the functioning 
of the European Union
In the process of European integration, we are dealing with a set of three 
closely related trends: deepening (new common policies and the progressive 
centralization in already existing common policies), widening (the adoption of 
new Member States) and, especially since the 1990s, differentiation. Between 
them there are close interconnections and interdependencies, but their nature is 
clearly changing. 
Though the European Communities were, generally, “based on the principle of 
equal rights and obligations for all Member States with respect to all Community 
policies” (Kölliker, 2006, p. 2), a certain level of differentiated integration in the 
EC (and later in the EU) has been present since the beginning of the integration 
process. At the beginning of the EC, integration was territorially (horizontally) 
and functionally (vertically) limited with a high level of unification (Leuffen, 
Rittberger, & Schimmelfenning, 2013, pp. 26–27). Having regard to the different 
types of integration differentiation indicated in the first part (“instrumental” 
and “constitutional”), introduced by Schimmelfenning and Winzen, and taking 
into account the period from 1958 and the diversification lasting at least one 
year, the authors found 194 differentiations, 82 of which were introduced by 
the reform treaty and 112 by accession (Schimmelfenning & Winzen, 2014, 
p. 364). At the same time, before the entry into force of the TM, the scale of 
differentiation in the primary law was very low—only 1–2 per cent of all treaty 
articles had an actual differentiation. With the entry into force of the Schengen 
agreements, this rose to above 30 per cent. The enlargement of the EU to include 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the TL, and the reforms in the EU 
meant an increase in the relevant provisions of the treaties which signified a 
differentiation in the EU to a level of around 43 per cent at the end of 2012 
(Schimmelfenning & Winzen, 2014, p. 358). Tuytschaever (1999, pp. 7–32) also 
writes on the differentiation in the TEEC, the SEA and the TM, while Winzen 
(2016) speaks of the differentiation in secondary law. 
Up until the accession of 13 states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU in 
the years 2004–2013, each extension was accompanied by measures aimed at far-
reaching integration. However, ever since the EU was enlarged by the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, a new situation evolved. This extension, the 
greatest in history, was not accompanied by an adequate, successful, deepening of 
integration. What is more, the provisions on enhanced cooperation contained in the 
TA, as was shown in the second part, opened the path to a greater differentiation 
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in the EU. Given the categorization by Tuytschaever (1999), referred to in the 
first part, it should be pointed out that insofar as the changes in the treaties that 
led to differentiation in integration before the TA were of a “negative” nature, 
that is, they allowed certain countries of the EU (EC) not to participate in 
selected integrating projects, enhanced cooperation signified a differentiation of 
integration of a “positive” nature, that is, it provided those Member States that had 
the will and means with the possibility of participating in the cooperation. The 
difference lies in the fact that the potential differentiation of integration resulting 
from enhanced cooperation is, at least theoretically, unlimited. Eric Philippart and 
Geoffrey Edwards (1999, p. 105) wrote about the introduction of the provisions 
on enhanced cooperation stating “if it is not a revolution insofar as orthodoxy 
was always more a pious aspiration than a reality, it is a major modification of 
the ethos of the Community-method”. In this way, widening became a factor 
conducive to differentiation; however, it increased not only because of enlargement 
(preferences and the possibilities of the new Member States), see, for example, 
Schimmelfennig’s (2014) attempt to provide a theoretical explanation of the issue.
The threefold establishment of enhanced cooperation since the year 2010 means 
that enhanced cooperation is becoming an integral part of the functioning of 
the EU. The provisions on enhanced cooperation is of considerable importance 
for the functioning of the EU. Firstly, they provide the legal framework for 
the differentiation of integration which is already in progress. Secondly, the 
prospect of the enlargement of the EU by more than a dozen countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe triggered fears that their acceptance into the EU may, for 
example, impede the integration process as these countries will not want to, or 
will not be able to participate in all integration activities being undertaken (it is 
worth noting that the accession treaties from 2003, 2005 and 2011 were based on 
the “no opting-out” principle, that is only temporary derogations were accepted, 
but not definitive). 
 The more countries the EU integrates, the more likely it is to have 
a membership with heterogeneous preferences and capabilities. The 
more policy sectors it integrates, the more likely they will include 
value-laden or redistributive policies that provoke intense conflict 
and are difficult to manage and settle. Finally, the more supra-
nationally centralized European integration becomes, the more it 
reduces state autonomy and the more likely it provokes nationalist 
backlash (Schimmelfenning & Winzen, 2014, p. 360). 
The provisions on enhanced cooperation were supposed to help circumvent 
any possible problems related thereto and ensure that the integration process 
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would not lose its momentum. In theory, for an EU Member State, remaining 
outside an integration project means greater autonomy at the expense of a 
smaller say on the decisions being made. Empirical studies suggest that in 
some cases the difference between insiders and outsiders is vague and these 
countries have some influence on the content of the adopted legislation, as 
in the case of the United Kingdom and Denmark with regard to justice and 
home affairs (Adler-Nissen, 2009, pp. 64–65). The results of other studies 
(relating to the remaining of Britain, Denmark and Sweden outside of the 
eurozone) indicate that remaining outside, which results in, for example, 
“decreasing access to informal networks” in the decision-making process of 
the EU institutions, does not actually have to take place in practice (Naurin 
& Lindahl, 2010). Therefore, according to Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl 
(2010, pp. 505–506), “flexible integration may be a more realistic solution for 
dealing with intensified preference heterogeneity in the EU than previously 
anticipated”. It should be noted that enlargement of the EU does not mean 
bigger differentiation in each case: some new Member States may have 
stronger tendency to foster the integration process than the old ones.     
Thirdly, the following question should be posed: why should a group of EU 
countries that wish to deepen integration be restricted in their efforts to deeper 
integration by another state or several states unwilling to do so? And it would be 
difficult to justify why an EU state or a small group of states should be conferred 
the right to block other Member States in enhancing their mutual integration. 
Provisions on enhanced cooperation can be seen as an answer to this problem. 
The impact of enhanced cooperation on the prevention of stagnation in the 
process of integration can be at least twofold. Firstly, the states which establish 
such cooperation may become a pioneering group that sets the trends, and after 
some time they are joined by more Member States encouraged by their example 
(Kölliker, 2006). Such a model is delivered especially in the framework of the 
EMU—the first 11 EU countries qualified for the third stage of Monetary Union 
in 1998 were joined later by other states. Secondly, the possibility that only a 
part of the Member States decide to deepen integration can act as a deterrent 
for the other EU Member States, which approach such a deepening from a 
distance or even with reluctance. Fear of marginalization, non-participation in 
the integration process fully, or bearing the mark of a secondary EU Member 
State may prompt these countries to join in the efforts to deepen integration as 
it might be better to participate in such a venture and attempt to influence the 
content of the amendments to suit its own interests from the inside than to stand 
on the sidelines and have no impact on the process whatsoever. The theoretical 
approach proposed by Kroll and Leuffen (2015, p. 367) acknowledges that the 
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possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation is a factor which is conducive 
to the adoption of solutions by all EU Member States. 
However, the undertaking of enhanced cooperation by a group of EU states 
may lead to a series of significant complications for the process of integration. 
Firstly, the abovementioned deterrence function of enhanced cooperation can 
also be looked at from another perspective. The point is that some Member 
States, which do not intend to take part in an integration project in the framework 
of the EU, may treat the risk of participating in enhanced cooperation by a 
group of EU states as a certain kind of “blackmail”. As a result, participation in 
such an integration project may be perceived as something imposed, since the 
decision to participate in it will be made more for fear of remaining outside the 
mainstream of integration and being marginalized, rather than because of the 
perception that participation in the project is done in the interest of the country 
and due to a genuine desire to deepen integration. Secondly, if a group of EU 
states participates in all (or most) of these projects, this group will be seen 
as avant-garde, demonstrating a clearly deeper degree of integration compared 
with other Member States. In this situation, enhanced cooperation could become 
a factor leading rather to the disintegration within the EU and promoting the 
differentiation of EU states rather than a deepening of their integration. Jose M. 
de Areilza (2000, p. 73), for example, expressed the opinion that “in the end, 
it may come to be that the words ‘Community’ or ‘Union’ will invoke cynical 
smiles”.  
Another problem associated with enhanced cooperation is its compliance with 
the fundamental principles of integration in the EU and EU law, which include 
the principle of solidarity, equality of the Member States and the unity of EU 
legal standards. According to, for example, Slawomir Dudzik (2003), enhanced 
cooperation allows for the “replacement, at least in some cases, of the joint 
efforts of all Member States to achieve defined integration objectives by the 
actions of only some states”. Enhanced cooperation “also introduces exemptions 
from the principle of equality of the Member States” with regard to EU law, 
because it leads to an “unjustified diversification of the rights and responsibilities 
of the Member States depending on whether they participate in circles of 
cooperation and how many such circles there are”. In addition, the frequent use 
of enhanced cooperation will also “result in a progressive fragmentation of EU’s 
legal system” and “a progressive erosion of the principle of unity of community 
order.” (Dudzik, 2003, pp. 37–38) If enhanced cooperation was to be undertaken 
very often and by different groups of countries, this would inevitably lead to 
an increasingly greater diversification of legal standards in the Member States 
and to an erosion of the uniformity of the acquis communautaire of the EU. 
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The development of enhanced cooperation and progressive differentiation is a 
challenge also for the functioning of EU institutions—that is, the participation 
in debates and the right to vote of the representatives of states not participating 
in a policy. For example, as noted by Jean-Claude Piris, theoretically, if less than 
half of the Member States (9–13) participate in enhanced cooperation and when 
the consent of the Commission is required, one can imagine a situation in which 
the members of the Commission coming from countries other than those which 
intend to establish enhanced cooperation, can block the adoption of a decision 
made by the Commission in this respect. The same applies to the European 
Parliament (Piris, 2012, pp. 118–119). 
Another very interesting question is associated with the aforementioned issues. 
Karolina Rokicka (2005, p. 93) indicates the possibility of “establishing 
enhanced cooperation within the framework of already existing enhanced 
cooperations (the so-called multi-tier model) or the establishment of further 
enhanced cooperation in the same area in which one already functions (the so-
called parallel model)”—and this is, after all, at least theoretically possible in a 
situation in which the establishment of enhanced cooperation only requires nine 
EU Member States. In EU law there are no regulations on this issue. In practice, 
of course, this would be certainly difficult and if it happened, it would signify 
very far-reaching complications for the EU law and even bigger problems for 
the functioning of EU institutions. 
Decisions on enhanced cooperation have been contested at the EU Court of 
Justice by countries not participating in this cooperation. Such a state of affairs, 
in which two parties crystallize and a dispute between them arises, is rather 
difficult to be considered as something positively influencing the relations 
between the EU Member States. On the one hand, enhanced cooperation can 
become a cause of conflict in the EU. On the other hand, a factor that may 
relieve possible conflict is when groups of states participating in enhanced 
cooperation and those opposing it are different even if subsequent decisions on 
enhanced cooperation are made and challenged at the EU Court of Justice by the 
Member States not participating in this cooperation. This has been the case so 
far in the three presented situations. As is the case in many other aspects of the 
functioning of the EU, today’s allies can become tomorrow’s opponents, which 
will not prevent them from cooperating again the day after that.     
Reforms of the eurozone very strongly contributed to an increase in differentiated 
integration in the EU. As a result, the difference between the states with a 
common currency and other members of the EU is even greater. In addition 
to this, the fiscal compact has the nature of an intergovernmental agreement 
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adopted outside the legal framework of the EU (it is to be incorporated into EU 
law within five years), which has not been signed by all EU Member States. It 
appears that this may raise doubts whether EU institutions can act for the benefit 
of its signatories. 
7. Conclusion
A deepening of differentiated integration in the EU (EC) accompanies each 
subsequent enlargement, though, as Schimmelfenning and Winzen (2014, p. 359) 
claim on the basis of their quantitative research, this is a temporary increase and 
the increase in differentiation “is neither linear nor irreversible”. Differentiated 
integration in the EU can be perceived and justified as a “consensus-building 
strategy for countries with deviant preferences” (Winzen 2016, p. 102). However, 
it appears that the increase in differentiation observed in recent years requires us 
to look at it from a different perspective. This is because differentiation resulting 
from the development of enhanced cooperation and deepening of the integration 
of the euro area countries is much more significant for the cohesion of the EU 
than, for example, transitional periods when new countries accede to the EU 
(EC) or the exemptions contained in protocols appended to the treaties. The 
deepening of the integration of the euro area countries and the development 
of enhanced cooperation means not only a “quantitative” but above all, a 
“qualitative” increase in differentiation of integration in the EU. It seems that 
the biggest threat for the EU and the integration process may result not from 
the temporary differentiation of integration, but, above all, from the inability to 
join the more integrated group of the EU Member States by the ones which were 
not ready or willing to join from the beginning.  In addition, taking into account 
the agreement developed by the European Council on 18–19 February 2016 
(European Council, 2016), regardless of whether the UK will remain in the EU 
or leave the organization6, differentiation will increase. Should the decision be 
to remain in the EU, the worked out agreement will mean the entry into force of 
regulations which will continue to relax the ties connecting the UK to the EU. 
The consequences of UK’s opting-out from the EU, apart from the extremely 
significant consequences for both the EU and the UK, also include, for example, 
a weakening the position of those states which currently, like the UK, do not 
participate in all the common policies of the EU. The main, albeit not new, issue 
related to the progressing differentiation is expressed by the following question: 
6 The paper was completed before the 23 June 2016 referendum in the United King-
dom on remaining in or leaving the European Union.  
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how much differentiated integration can the EU accommodate? The said factors 
require this question to be posed again and the issue of the so-called “integration 
trap” (Andersen & Sitter, 2006) to be raised anew. In a broader context, it is 
worth mentioning that such factors as progressing globalization and increasing 
international competition, the global economic crisis and its implications or 
populist, radical and anti-EU political movements have a strong impact on the 
divisions among the EU Member States.    
Tomasz Kubin, PhD and Dr. hab. in Social Sciences in the field of Political Science, is 
associate professor at the Department of International Relations, head of the Laboratory 
of European Integration at the Institute of Political Sciences and Journalism, University 
of Silesia in Katowice. He has also completed postgraduate courses in international 
trade (University of Economics in Katowice) and the law of European Union (Jagiellonian 
University). Kubin’s main scientific interests are European integration (especially the 
institutional system of the European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, external 
relations of the EU, diversity of integration within the EU), international relations and issues 
connected with Belarus. 
References
Adler-Nissen, R. (2009), ‘Behind the scenes of differentiated integration: Circumventing 
national opt-outs in justice and home affairs,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 62–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760802453239
Agreement… (2013), Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 175/01, 20.06.2013.
Andersen, S. & Sitter, N. (2006), ‘Differentiated integration: What is it and how 
much can the EU accommodate?’ Journal of European Integration, vol. 28, no. 4, 
pp. 313–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330600853919 
Commission Decision 2012/714/EU of 21 November 2012 confirming the participation 
of Lithuania in enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce 
and legal separation, Official Journal of the European Union, L 323/18, 22.11.2012. 
Commission Decision 2014/39/EU of 27 January 2014 confirming the participation of 
Greece in enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and 
legal separation, Official Journal of the European Union, L 023/41, 28.01.2014.
Commission Decision 2015/1753/EU of 30 September 2015on confirming the 
participation of Italy in enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection, Official Journal of the European Union, L 256/19, 01.10.2015.
102
Tomasz Kubin
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 7, No. 2 (23)
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 326/13, 26.10.2012.
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 326/47, 26.10.2012.
Convention between… (2006), Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic 
of Austria on the stepping-up cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, Council of the European Union, 
16382/06, Brussels, 06.12.2006. Retrieved from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016382%202006%20INIT [accessed Aug 2017]
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 210, 06.08.2008. 
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of the Decision 
2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 210, 06.08.2008.
Council Decision 2010/405/EU of 12 July 2010 authorising enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 189/12, 22.07.2010.
Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in 
the area of creation of unitary patent protection, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 076/53, 22.03.2011.
Council Decision 2013/52/EU of 22 January 2013 authorising enhanced cooperation 
in the area of financial transaction tax, Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 022/11, 25.01.2013.
Council Regulation 1259/2010/EU of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 343/10, 29.12.2010. 
Council Regulation 1260/2012/EU of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to 
the applicable translation arrangements, Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 361/89, 31.12.2012.
de Areilza, J. M. (2000), ‘Reforma instytucjonalna Unii Europejskiej a nowy ustrój 
europejski,’ in E. Popławska (ed.) Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się Europy, 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytut Spraw Publicznych, pp. 65–81.
Dudzik, S. (2003), ‘Mechanizm wzmocnionej współpracy na tle konstytucyjnych zasad 
porządku prawnego Unii Europejskiej,’ Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego, no. 1, 
pp. 7–39.
103
Enhanced Cooperation, EMU Reforms and Their Implications 
for Differentiation in the European Union 
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 7, No. 2 (23)
Dyson, K. & Marcussen, M. (2010), ‘Transverse integration in European economic 
governance: Between unitary and differentiated integration,’ Journal of European 
Integration, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 17–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330903375107
Dyson, K. & Sepos, A. (2010), ‘Differentiation as design principle and as tool in the 
political management of European integration,’ in K. Dyson & A. Sepos (eds.) 
Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230289529_1
Ehlermann, C. D. (1998), ‘Differentiation, flexibility, closer co-operation: The new 
provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty,’ European Law Journal, vol. 4, no. 3, 
pp. 246–270. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0386.00052
European Council (2011), 24–25 March 2011 Meeting, Conclusions, EUCO 10/1/11, 
Annex 1. Brussels, 20 April 2011. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf [accessed Aug 2017]
—— (2016), 18 and 19 February 2016 Meeting, Conclusions, EUCO1/16, Brussels, 
19 February 2016. Retrieved from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-1-2016-INIT/en/pdf [accessed Aug 2017]
European Union (1992a), Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark, Treaty 
on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 191/89, 
29.07.1992.
—— (1992b), Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, C 191/87, 29.07.1992.
—— (1992c), Protocol on social policy, Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, C 191/87, 29.07.1992.
—— (1992d), Protocol on the acquisition of property in Denmark, Treaty on European 
Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 191/87, 29.07.1992.
—— (1997a), Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European 
Union, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, signed at Amsterdam, 
2 October 1997, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 340/01, 10.11.1997.
—— (1997b), Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and to 
Ireland, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, signed 
at Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
C 340/01, 10.11.1997.
—— (1997c), Protocol on the position of Denmark, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts, signed at Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, C 340/01, 10.11.1997.
104
Tomasz Kubin
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 7, No. 2 (23)
—— (1997d), Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Treaty of 
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts, signed at Amsterdam, 2 October 
1997, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 340/01, 10.11.1997.
—— (2007a), Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C 306/153, 17.12.2007.
—— (2007b), Protocol on the Euro Group. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at 
Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306/153, 
17.12.2007.
——  (2011), Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 
9 December 2011. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126658.pdf [accessed Aug 2017]
Euro Summit Statement (2011), Brussels, 26 October 2011. Retrieved from http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf [accessed 
Aug 2017]
Fiorini, A. (2010), ‘Harmonizing the law applicable to divorce and legal separation 
– enhanced cooperation as a way forward?’ International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 1143–1158.     
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589310000564
Holzinger, K. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2012), ‘Differentiated integration in the European 
Union: many concepts, sparse theory, few data,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 292–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.641747
Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European Union [2013], 
C-247/11 and C-295/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240.
Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union [2015], C-147/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:299.
Kingdom of Spain v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2015], 
C-146/13, ELI:EU:C:2015:298.
Kölliker, A. (2006), Flexibility and European Unification. The Logic of Differentiated 
Integration, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.     
Kroll, D. A. & Leuffen, D. (2015), ‘Enhanced cooperation in practice: an analysis of 
differentiated integration in EU secondary law,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 353–373. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.956781
Kuipers, J-J. (2012), ‘The law applicable to divorce as test ground for enhanced 
cooperation,’ European Law Journal, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 201–229.  
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00594.x
105
Enhanced Cooperation, EMU Reforms and Their Implications 
for Differentiation in the European Union 
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 7, No. 2 (23)
Leuffen, D.; Rittberger, B. & Schimmelfenning, F. (2013), Differentiated Integration. 
Explaining Variation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-28501-0
Naurin, D. & Lindahl, R. (2010), ‘Out in the cold? Flexible integration and the political 
status of Euro opt-outs,’ European Union Politics, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 485–509. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116510382463
Peers, S. (2010), ‘Divorce, European style: the first authorization of enhanced 
cooperation,’ European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 339–358. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019610300022
Philippart, E. & Edwards, G. (1999), ‘The provisions on closer cooperation in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam: The politics of flexibility in the European Union,’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 87–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
5965.00151
Piris, J.-C. (2012), The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Regulation 1257/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 
2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection, Official Journal of the European Union, L 361/01, 31.12.2012.
Rokicka, K. (2005), ‘Wzmocniona współpraca w wymiarze sprawiedliwości i 
sprawach wewnętrznych UE,’ in F. Jasiński & K. Smoter (eds.) Obszar wolności, 
bezpieczeństwa i sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej. Geneza, stan i perspektywy 
rozwoju, Warszawa: Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, pp. 81–103.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2014), ‘EU enlargement and differentiated integration: 
Discrimination or equal treatment?’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, 
no. 5, pp. 681–698. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.897744
Schimmelfenning, F. & Winzen, T. (2014), ‘Instrumental and constitutional 
differentiation in the European Union,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 
vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 354–370. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12103
Schimmelfennig, F.; Leuffen, D. & Rittberger, B. (2015), ‘The European Union 
as a system of differentiated integration: Interdependence, politicization and 
differentiation,’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 764–782. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1020835
Stubb, A. C.-G. (1996), ‘A categorization of differentiated integration,’ Journal 
of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 283–295.   
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1996.tb00573.x
The Euro Plus Pact (2011), Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness 
and Convergence, European Council 24–25 March 2011, Conclusions, EUCO 
10/1/11, Annex 1. Brussels, 20.04.2011. 
Tuytschaever, F. (1999), Differentiation in European Law, Oxford: Hart.
106
Tomasz Kubin
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 7, No. 2 (23)
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, signed at Amsterdam, 2 October 
1997, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 340/01, 10.11.1997.
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Official Journal 
of the European Union, C 306/01, 17.12.2007.
Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 191/01, 
29.07.1992.
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Brussels, 01.02.2012. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-
12-2_en.htm [accessed Aug 2017]
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European 
Union [2014], C-209/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:283.
Winzen, T. (2016), ‘From capacity to sovereignty: Legislative politics and differentiated 
integration in the European Union,’ European Journal of Political Research, 
vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 100–119. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12124
Zhelyazkova, A. (2014), ‘From selective integration into selective implementation: The 
link between differentiated integration and conformity with EU laws,’ European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 727–746.   
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12062
